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Abstract 
 
The objective of the paper is to empirically assess the comovement of emerging bond returns of the key constituent 
countries of the EMBI Global benchmark index since their introduction (broadly in 1997) up to the present. We aim 
at disentangling the respective roles of common external factors and pure contagion in the recent events of market 
spillovers. The unweighted average of cross country rolling correlation coefficients, adjusted and unadjusted for the 
presence of common external factors, provides a first assessment of the  joint behavior of emerging markets bond 
returns during the sample period.  
We furthermore show that cross country average correlations method may not be useful in summarizing market 
results if the underlying distribution of bond returns is not unimodal (i.e., if there are underlying groups that exhibit 
high within-group comovement but not between-group comovement).  
Several methods are used on a year-to-year basis in order to identify periods where the “two-tier paradigm” of 
emerging markets prevails. The analysis of correlation matrixes enables us to identify groups of countries moving 
together during the recent events in emerging markets. These findings are further refined by performing Principal 
Component and Cluster Analysis. We provide a method in order to quantify the excess comovement common to all 
emerging countries as well as the country specific one. Finally, we find evidence of “market tiering” and investor 
discrimination especially during tranquil times: the first three quarters of 1997, from the third quarter of 1999 to the 
end of 2000 and from 2003 onwards.  
We suggest that regional patterns and credit quality differentiation have an important role to play in the investors’ 
discriminating behavior regarding the emerging bond markets whenever the period is free of strong and unforeseen 
shocks leading to spillover across countries and markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 A salient feature of emerging markets over the past decade has been their proneness to volatility 
spillovers and contagion across countries and markets during crisis episodes. The Tequila crisis of 1994-
95, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default and the collapse of LTCM in 1998, the Brazilian peso 
devaluation at the beginning of 1999, the US High Yield crisis in 2000, the Enron scandal in 2001 and the 
run-up to the Argentine debt default in late 2002, all were accompanied by the transmission of financial 
market volatility across borders.  
 These sharp spikes in volatility are usually captured by increased cross country market 
correlations in the now vast literature on contagion. One of the main questions we are trying to address in 
this paper is whether these increases in the emerging markets comovement are attributable to common 
shocks or to a “pure” contagion phenomenon.  
 The paper could thus be embedded in the empirical literature on contagion viewed as excess –
comovement, that is, the transmission of shocks from one market or country to others, unexplained either 
by common shocks or fundamental links among the countries.  
The first authors to have quantified the excess-comovement as a measure of contagion in mature markets 
are Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990, 1993). After taking into account common fundamentals, they showed 
that there is residual comovement across stocks from very different industries and idiosyncratic 
fundamentals.  
By contrast, little is known with regard to emerging markets as far as the residual comovement is 
concerned. For instance, in the case of the exchange rate variation, Masson (1999a, b, and c) identifies 
three components, namely: “monsoonal” shocks or common shocks simultaneously affecting all countries, 
spillovers occurring through trade and economic relations and a residual, the component unexplained by 
the previous systematic relations and referred to as “contagion”.  
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) test for evidence of contagion between the financial markets of East Asian 
countries. In order to account for residual comovement, they control for own country and cross border 
news (using a set of dummy variables) and other fundamentals and show evidence of cross-border 
contagion in the currency and equity markets. The dummy variables they use are proxies for the country’s 
own fundamentals but they can be also viewed as source of contagion for other countries. The authors 
estimate the impact of these dummies on the financial markets through country-by-country regressions. 
They further analyze the residuals of these regressions to see the extent of cross-border correlations after 
controlling for fundamentals. Valdes (1997) uses secondary market debt prices as well as country credit 
ratings and shows that fundamentals are unable to explain the cross- country comovement of 
creditworthiness in Latin American countries.  
 Regarding the interpretation of the excess comovement, the literature attributed this residual 
comovement either to multiple equilibria (sunspots) or to market behavior.  Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and 
Masson (1997) develop a Markov-switching model in application to the ERM crisis. According to their 
vision, discontinuities in the shock transmission process are associated to jumps between multiple 
equilibria in the currency market.  
 As for the market-based interpretation of contagion to which our paper is related, there are mainly 
three strands of literature. According to the first one, contagion can be captured by shifts in market 
investors’ perceptions and attitudes towards risk (Kumar and Persaud (2001)). The second strand of the 
literature considers that contagion is the result of herding behavior of investors (Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992), Christie and Huang (1995) Kim and Wei (1999a), Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999)). Finally, 
according to the last view, contagion is the result of “wake up calls” by investors (Goldstein (1998), Baig 
and Goldfajn (1999), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999)). 
The present paper represents an empirical investigation of the comovement of emerging bond returns of 
the key constituent countries of the EMBI Global benchmark index over the period 1997 -2005. 
Our aim is to assess the respective part of common external factors and market behavior in explaining 
comovements in emerging markets bond returns.  
Generally, comovements in emerging bond markets can be captured by the rolling average correlation of 
bond returns. These returns may be driven by a wide range of underlying factors: external or internal to 
the asset class or to the issuing country. Therefore we expect that the eventual market comovement be 
explained by heterogeneous factors.  
  
We can roughly divide these factors in two categories, namely: 
-common external factors characterizing developed countries (in particular the US); 
-factors other than the common external ones, accounting for the residual comovement of emerging 
markets. These factors can be attributed to the international investors’ behavior who shift between asset 
classes and markets according to their anticipations and attitude towards risk. 
In order to disentangle the respective roles of common external factors and market based transmission 
channel in the recent events of market spillovers we use average correlations of each country returns with 
the rest of the EMBI global sample, adjusted and unadjusted for the presence of common external factors 
(US-TB, US-HY and SPX Index returns). The correlation coefficients of residuals thus become a measure 
of “excess comovement” in emerging bond markets and we ascertain whether the major episodes of 
market turmoil are accompanied by significant increase of the adjusted correlations. In other words, we 
address and and try to answer the question whether the data support the popularly held view that increases 
in correlations render emerging market bonds more likely to a generalized sell off in case of a single event 
in a given country. 
However, global average correlations may prove to be inefficient in assessing market comovements in 
presence of market segmentation. We use several methods on an exogenous year-to-year basis in order to 
highlight major trends in investors’ behavior and attitudes towards risk in emerging countries. The 
question which then arises is whehther global investors are treating emerging market sovereign bonds 
indiscriminately or is there evidence of increased market tiering. 
The analysis of correlation matrixes of adjusted returns enables us to identify groups of countries moving 
together during the recent events in emerging markets. These findings are further refined by performing 
Factor analysis methods for each calendar year of the sample period. In doing so, we aim at identifying 
groups of countries that exhibit high within-group comovement but not between-group comovement. Even 
if the group composition may change over the year, the periods where the two groups are orthogonal (that 
is the between group rolling average is nearly zero) may be viewed as periods of increased investors 
discrimination regarding emerging bond markets. 
We furthermore inquire on the underlying factors of eventual market fragmentation and check whether the 
groups can be explained by regional aspects, credit rating, index weight, number of crises experienced 
recently. 
Our paper is organized as follows. The first part is dedicated to the average correlation analysis, adjusted 
and unadjusted for the presence of common external factors. The first section presents the methodological 
aspects while the second one summarizes the main results of this approach. In the second part of the paper 
we put into question the sample average correlation-based method and look for the presence of groups 
within the eighteen emerging bond markets returns of our sample. The motivations and the 
methodological aspects of sample tiering are presented in Section 3 whereas Section 4 exposes our main 
results. The last section concludes.  
 
 
I) AVERAGE CORRELATIONS: ADJUSTED AND UNADJUSTED 
1. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND DATA 
 
We use daily and five-day returns for 18 out of 33 emerging countries initially included in the JP EMBI 
Global1i according to the data availability over the period starting on the 3rd of March 1997 and ending on 
the 28th of February 2005. Data were obtained from Bloomberg. The selected countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and Venezuela) accounted for 92,4% of the Index in 1997 and 
for 87,51% at present2.  
                                                 
1 The J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global) tracks total returns for US-dollar 
denominated debt instruments issued by emerging markets soverereign and quasi-sovereign entities (Brady Bonds, 
Loans, Eurobonds, etc). Currently covers 189 instruments and 31 countries. For further methodological details see 
the end Notes (i) and  JPMorgan Methodology Brief “Introducing the JP Morgan Emerging Bond Index Global”, 
1999.  
2 See end Note (i) for changes in country index weights during the sample period.  
  
The adjustment for the presence of common external factors was performed using daily and five-day 
returns3 computed from the bond index value of total returnii, according to the following relations: 
)I/Iln(R ittit/t −− =        i = 1 or 5                                                              (1) 
where  
tI  represents the closing cumulative total return index level on day t and itI −  the last total index return  on 
the previous and respectively on the last fifth trading day;  
tR  denotes the (log) net rate of return between dates t-1 and t, and respectively t-5 and t; 
t is the trade date (according to the New York bond and holiday calendar and after harmonization with 
available trade dates for the independent variables).  
In order to deal with missing data in some limited cases of market closure among the emerging countries 
in the EMBI global, we computed the inferred price between the last trading day and the opening dayiii. 
Finally, we retained 2005 returns computed on a five-day basis.  
As far as the three US market indicators are concerned (TB, SPX and HY Indexes), we use the daily 
closing prices provided by Bloomberg and compute the daily and respectively five days returns according 
to the relation (1) previously mentioned.  
Initially there were 2015 trading dates for EMBI global, 2028 for SPX_Index and 2088 for both US_HY 
and US_ TB Index. After harmonization, we retained 2010 trading dates. Data for non-Asian countries 
were lagged by one day in order to adjust for the time difference between Asian and non Asian markets.  
In order to measure the emerging bond markets comovement and the transmission of shocks from one 
country/region to another we adopt an approach based on correlations of bond returns after controlling for 
common external factors. These factors will affect emerging countries differently according to their 
macroeconomic characteristics (trade links, international financing requirements, degree of integration in 
the world economy). 
More precisely, the bond returns (daily or computed on a 5-day basis-corresponding to a holding period 
for international investors) are adjusted for the presence of common external factors by performing rolling 
linear regressions of individual countries returns against the US Treasury returns (JPM US_TB5-7Y), the 
comprehensive US Stock Market Index (SPX_Indexiv) and a total return index of the US High Yield 
market (JOAO). The rolling regressions were performed over a 60-day window in order to separate the 
impact of external and respectively idiosyncratic factors of emerging markets comovement. Pairwise 
correlations are then estimated based on unadjusted and adjusted 5-day returns over the same 60-day 
window.  
By hypothesis, the external factors as endogenous variables, cannot explain any variation in the underlying 
residuals. Therefore, the residuals could be viewed as adjusted returns which are free from the influence of 
external common factors. Furthermore, the rolling canonical pairwise correlation of the regression 
residuals will capture the excess comovement of bond returns beyond common external factors/shocks.  
The estimated model can be written as following (for two countries i, j =1 to 18, i≠j) : 
For a given 60-day window : 
 t,it,HY_US3,it,Index_SPX2it,TB_US1,i0,it,i RRRR εββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=                                               (2)                      
 t,jt,HY_US3,jt,Index_SPX2,jt,TB_US1,j0,jt,j RRRR εββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=                                  (3)  
and the correlation coefficient of residuals thus become a measure of the co movement in bond 
returns after removing the influence of common external shocks.   
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The essence of the adjustment is then equivalent to a partial correlation between countries returns 
controlling for the effect of common factorsv.  
 
The first question that naturally arises is why focusing on only these three common factors? Trends in 
emerging debt markets are closely tied to developments in mature markets of industrial countries and in 
particular in the US. Therefore, in our analysis, we focus on what appeared to us to be the three major 
                                                 
3 We obtained more significant results whenever returns are computed over a holding period of five trading days as 
they are less affected by the autocorrelation of day by day returns. Therefore we present only the results using 5-day 
returns.  
  
benchmarks of the US markets because they are the most likely to induce fluctuations in emerging markets 
returns.  
In the first place, we take into account the US Treasury Bill returns for a maturity compatible with that of 
bonds included in the EMBI Global. The interest rates on Treasury Bills are virtually risk free rates and 
are commonly accepted as reflecting the general level of interest rates in the US economy. Studies on the 
international capital movements show that emerging markets bond returns are significantly affected by 
variations in the US interest rates4. 
The US_TB is characterized by lower risk of variation than emerging market bonds or US_High Yields 
and also by a lower return. During market rallies, whenever the emerging market prospects are 
encouraging, investors dump low yielding risk free TBs and buy emerging debt securities which offer a 
higher return. Their higher liquidity and the lower market risk come at the price of lower rates of return 
than debt or equity securities. Conversely, the global investors may shift to TBs in times of stress, 
whenever they have a perception of increased risk and are uncertain as to the economic prospects in 
emerging countries.  
In the second place, we took into account the SPX_Index - the composite index of US stock market as a 
proxy for the stock market portfolio. Unlike other stock market indexes (e.g. Dow Jones Industrial 
Average) which track the value of a portfolio with one share of each stock, the SPX_ Index reflects the 
value of a portfolio that holds shares in each firm in proportion to the number of outstanding shares. The 
behavior of the SPX_ Index is thus similar to that of the entire US stock market.  
The link between stock returns and those of emerging market bonds could be interpreted as a proxy for the 
global investors shift between competing asset classes. The investor behavior towards stocks depends on 
the growth perspectives of the concerned country (higher rates of investment, productivity growth, etc). 
Therefore, investors tend to prefer equities whenever the economy is doing well and shift to buy safer 
assets whenever the situation deteriorates.  
Finally, we take into account the performance of the high yield sector in the US with the aim of capturing 
the global investors’ behavior regarding two competing asset classes of similar risk. The selected JOAO 
Index is characterized by an average rating comparable to that of emerging markets (BB and B rated). 
Therefore the two indexes (HY Index and EMBI global) roughly reflect the same degree of risk. The sign 
and the importance of the HY coefficients in the regression of each emerging country returns against the 
three common external factors is an indication of an eventual investors shift between local and emerging 
market securities of similar risk.  
Nonetheless, the relationship between HY returns and emerging market debt returns is not straightforward. 
On the one hand, if there are concerns about the ability of corporate/sovereign issuers  to service or to roll-
over their debt in the HY/emerging market bond markets, we could expect global investors (in particular 
cross-over investors) to shift to the alternative market more attractive in terms of risk-return.  
On the other hand, troubles in the US_HY sector often reverberate through the emerging markets and sell 
offs in the first market trigger similar sell offs in the latter over the last years. Troubles in the HY sector 
(as it was the case during the US_HY crisis in the last quarter of 2000) could be associated by global 
investors with an increase in the overall risk of the portfolio. In this case, investors tend to reduce the 
exposure in similar securities in terms of risk (in particular, the emerging market bonds).  
 
 
2.  DESCRIPTION OF RESULTS 
2.1. Analysis of beta coefficients in initial regressions 
 
The beta coefficients as the sensitivity of bond market to changes in US_TB, SPX_Index or US_HY 
measure the variation induced in bond returns by a one percent variation of the exogenous variables. In 
terms of prices, the beta coefficients measure the growth rate of the emerging market bond price relative to 
the growth rate of the return on the external factors.  
Let us summarize the most important findings of our regressions. 
 
                                                 
4 e.g. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) show that increase in US interest rates, other things equal, are associated with 
capital outflows from Latin America, in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of 1994/95.  
  
US_TB coefficients 
 
 
The evolution of bond returns sensitivities to changes in the US_TB returns as illustrated in Annex 1 is a 
good indicator of changes in market behavior through the period under consideration. 
The US_ TB is characterized by lower risk of variation than EM bonds or US_ High Yields and also by a 
lower return. During market rallies, whenever the emerging market prospects are encouraging, investors 
dump low yielding risk free TB and buy emerging debt securities which offer a higher return. Their higher 
liquidity and the lower market risk come at the price of lower rates of return than debt or equity securities. 
Conversely, the global investors may shift to TB in times of stress, whenever they have a perception of 
increased risk and are uncertain as to the economic prospects in emerging countries.  
A positive link between the returns of these two assets would indicate an indiscriminate attitude regarding 
fixed-income securities and possible shifts between asset classes (e.g. between stocks and bonds). 
Therefore, the US_ TB link to emerging debt market may be viewed as a proxy for shifts in market beliefs 
and if this is the case, we would expect a negative link between yields of US_ TB and those of emerging 
bond markets. 
At the beginning of the period, until the Thai bath devaluation of July 1997, the emerging markets showed 
positive sensitivity of returns in response to changes in US_TB returns, which indicates investors’ 
indiscriminate attitude regarding fixed-income securities and possible shifts between asset classes (e.g. 
between stocks and bonds). 
Starting with the Asian crisis, the positive link between TB and emerging markets returns is broken. The 
first important drought took place around November 1997, followed by a peak of the same magnitude. 
During this period and until the end of 1999, Malaysia and the Philippines stand out as having the most 
volatile sensitivity in the sample.  
The next decoupling of emerging markets returns from the US_TB returns took place during the Russia 
default and LTCM crisis of September 1998. All emerging countries in the sample show particularly high 
negative sensitivity. However, Russia stands out with a coefficient of -23, Brazil, Ecuador, Malaysia and 
Venezuela with sensitivities to changes in the US_TB returns inferior to -10. The negative link between 
emerging market and US_TB returns suggests that investors substitute emerging market bonds to risk free 
zero coupon bonds according to their attitude towards risk. 
The Brazilian peso devaluation at the beginning of 1999 induced another significant drop in emerging 
market bond returns regarding the US_TB returns in the case of Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador5 and Russia 
(with a coefficient inferior to -8) and to a lesser extent Colombia, Croatia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru and 
Venezuela (coefficients inferior to -2). No significant impact on Bulgaria, Malaysia, Korea, the 
Philippines, Poland and Turkey is noticed. 
The Argentinean sell-off of March 2000 seems to have little impact on the sensitivities of emerging 
markets relative to the US_TB returns.  
The Nasdaq turbulence in the third quarter of 2000 induced a wave of positive sensitivity with the US_TB 
returns. Rises in US_TB returns were accompanied by simultaneous rises in emerging market returns in 
the case of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru Philippines, Russia, South Africa and 
Venezuela. Countries like Ecuador and Croatia exhibited negative sensitivity during this period and for the 
rest of countries in the sample the impulse is not significant.  
Starting with the beginning of 2001 and until towards the end of 2003, the variations in the US_TB returns 
seem to have little impact on country returns in the case of Bulgaria, Croatia, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Korea, Mexico and Venezuela. Conversely, the other countries 
coefficients are characterized by large fluctuations over the whole period.  
Throughout 2003, the mix of stimulative monetary policies and strengthening emerging market 
fundamentals contributed to a strong rally in asset prices and to a compression of credit spreads on bond 
markets. The perspective of lower returns on US Treasury Bonds led investors to shift to more attractive 
emerging debt securities within the same class of fixed income assets. Higher demand for emerging 
market debt induced a rise in prices and therefore higher returns. In presence of low interest rates in the 
US, US _TB prices were high and investors, in their fight for performance, preferred other more yielding 
assets like emerging debt bonds or (high yield) corporate bonds.  
                                                 
5 Particularly volatile during this period 
  
At the beginning of 2004 anticipations of a less accommodative monetary stance come out. Investors 
became more cautious and started to adjust their portfolios to the prospect of an increase in US interest 
rates moving up in the credit quality spectrum and reducing the duration of their portfolios. When 
effective, in June 2004, the measure induced a peak in sensitivities with the US_TB returns especially in 
Latin American countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela). That means 
that the fall in US_TB returns induced losses of greater magnitude in most vulnerable emerging markets. 
However, from the last quarter of 2004 onwards the US_TB fluctuations seem to have no significant 
impact on emerging market returns.   
 
 
SPX_Index coefficients 
 
 
Emerging bond sensitivities to changes in equity market returns could be viewed as a proxy for the global 
portfolio relocations between bonds and equity. Annex 2 shows that over the period under consideration, 
the impulses from the stock market had a lower impact on all countries (with the exception of Russia in 
1998-1999) than those from US_TB and US_HY markets.  
The SPX_Index returns reached a low on 27th of October 1997, 7 days after the Hong Kong stock market 
collapse. Positive coefficients in the rolling regressions covering this period reflect that returns on 
emerging market bonds also decreased more or less proportionally.  
Another event which intensified the link between the two markets was the Russian default in July 1998 
and the LTCM crisis at the end of September 1998. During this period equity returns were negative almost 
all the time, with an important through at the end of August (in the aftermath of Russian default) and 
another in October 1998 (in the aftermath of the LTCM collapse). Negative coefficients during this period 
reflect an opposite movement of bond and equity returns. The sharp decrease in the SPX_Index was 
accompanied by a rise of emerging bond market returns. Prices and yields moving in different directions 
could be an indication of investors shift between markets, in this case, from the stock market to the 
emerging bond market. This is due to the underlying drop in the SPX_Index returns.  
As the events in Russia directly affected the emerging sovereign debt market, the sign of coefficients 
could indicate if the similar drop in other emerging market bond returns is due to contagion from Russia or 
to external factors. Furthermore it could give information on investors’ behavior and portfolio rebalancing 
between bonds and equities. In the aftermath of the Russian devaluation we notice that sensitivities of all 
countries with the SPX_Index started to decline and approached zero which means that the evolution in 
emerging market returns were less explained by external factors during this period. In the case in which 
returns on emerging market bonds are lower than those on equities, there is a part for spillovers from 
Russia in explaining market comovement. We can notice that during this period the drop in emerging 
market bonds returns took place before the drop in SPX_Index returns (with the exception of Croatia) 
which means that it was a consequence of events in Russia affecting all emerging markets. 
The next fall in SPX_Index returns in October seems to modify the link between the two markets as 
almost all countries suffered a drop in their sensitivities with the equity market. In the aftermath of the 
LTCM crisis, the equity returns dropped sharply in October 1998. A negative coefficient for all the 
emerging countries in the sample suggests that the emerging bond market was unaffected by this event and 
returns moved in the opposite direction.  
In the aftermath of the Brazilian peso devaluation of January 1999, the link between the two markets 
became positive and reached a peak in March 1999. However, the coefficients were strictly superior to 
unity only in the case of Russia meaning that the decrease in emerging market returns couldn’t be entirely 
explained by external factors and that the market also had a role to play in returns comovement.  
The main events at the end of 2001 (Enron collapse) and in 2002 (mainly the Argentinean default) induced 
a peak in sensitivities in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Philippines and Turkey. The bursting of the 
technology, media and telecom (TMT) bubble and an widespread equity price declines in mature markets 
was accompanied by a heightened perception of risk and an indiscriminate attitude towards high-risk 
assets. Investors rebalanced their portfolios away from equity and low grade bonds towards higher quality 
assets (e.g. Treasury Bills). 
 
 
 
  
US_HY coefficients  
 
 
Annex 3 illustrates the evolution of bond returns sensitivities to US_HY return variations. 
The US corporate high yield bonds are often viewed by global investors as competing asset class to 
emerging market bonds. This is due to the higher risk (and returns) associated to the high yield sector 
compared to TB or US investment-grade bonds, making them similar in some way to the emerging market 
bonds. Over the period under consideration the US_ HY sector experienced downgrading and massive sell 
offs which had an impact on the emerging bond markets as well.  
At the beginning of the sample period the returns on emerging markets bonds displayed broadly positive 
and low sensitivities. 
The first drop in coefficients occurred during the Asian crisis, in the aftermath of the Hong-Kong stock 
exchange collapse. During this period, emerging market returns proved to be far more volatile than returns 
on HY. They fell dramatically in early October and this movement seemed unrelated to the evolution of 
HY returns (which increase and decrease slightly) with the exception of Colombian returns which remains 
positively correlated with HY returns. After this date sensitivities became significantly positive and 
reached an important peak at the beginning of 1998 in almost all the countries in the sample which 
indicates that an increase/decrease in HY returns induced an upward/downward movement in emerging 
markets. This situation could thus reflect a generalized sell-off (in the case of a simultaneous drop in both 
markets) when a sudden increase in the overall risk of the investors’ portfolio leads them to dump risky 
assets and to increase the part of safe assets. The simultaneous increase in returns could be the result of 
investors’ reallocation between different classes of assets (from stocks to fixed-income securities). 
We can notice a new important drop in sensitivities (especially for Russia and Ecuador) taking place in the 
run-up to the Russian default of May 1998 and indicating an opposite movement of the two markets.  
Starting with this date coefficients began to rise and became positive in July 1998 which reflects the 
simultaneous drop in emerging markets and HY returns. After an insignificant drop in October 1998, 
sensitivities rose again to reach a peak in the aftermath of the LTCM crisis, in November 1998. This is an 
all time high (over our sample period) for most countries (the most sensitive are Bulgaria, Ecuador, 
Russia, Peru and Venezuela). Returns on emerging countries were low below zero and far more volatile 
than the returns on corporate bonds. 
After this date sensitivities started to decline in such a way that at the time of the Brazilian peso 
devaluation in January 1998, returns on emerging market bonds became negative whereas HY returns kept 
fluctuating within a small interval. This is an indication that the two markets evolved in opposite 
directions as a result of investors shift within the same class of risk, between emerging markets and local 
corporate bond market.  
During the first months of 1999 emerging markets sensitivities became almost zero indicating a 
decoupling of the two markets. Another significant peak is reached in mid 1999, when both returns on 
emerging markets increased.  
In the run up to the Argentinean sell off of January 2000 coefficients became highly positive for Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Russia and Venezuela which puts into light a simultaneous upward movement in HY and 
emerging markets returns. In the wake of the Argentinean sell-off, coefficients on HY returns declined for 
the majority of the countries in the sample to insignificantly positive levels or significantly negative levels 
in the case of Colombia, Croatia, Russia, Venezuela. As for Peru and Philippines, they reached a drought 
in sensitivities later, in November 2000.  
A new rise in coefficients was recorded in the second semester of 2000, during the HY crisis especially in  
Colombia, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia and Venezuela.  
During 2001 coefficients remained at levels close to zero which suggests that the impact of HY returns 
becomes less and less important. The exception is Argentina, with extremely volatile sensitivities during 
the whole sample period. 
In the wake of the Turkey devaluation we notice a drop in coefficients although they remained at an 
insignificant level. It is worth noticing that during this period emerging market returns dropped 
dramatically whereas HY returns fluctuate closely to zero suggesting a weak association between 
emerging and HY markets.  
Over the last part of the sample period there are generally no more extreme variations in returns. The 
exceptions are the Philippines with sensitivities rising to significant levels in 2003, Colombia, Ecuador 
Brazil and Venezuela whose sensitivities increase significantly over the last two years and finally, Turkey, 
  
the most volatile, displaying positive sensitivities during the whole sample period. Since the beginning of 
2005 the only country displaying negative sensitivities is Ecuador and Venezuela, country rated as 
underinvestment grade. This could indicate that investors shifted within the same class of risk, 
between those emerging markets bonds and local corporate bond market.  
As a general remark, let us say that, starting roughly with the last quarter of 2001, the emerging countries 
sensitivities to the evolutions on the HY sector are far less volatile than they were at the beginning of the 
sample period (which comforts the results of decreasing correlation between emerging market returns and 
the three external factors at the end of the sample period). 
 
2.2. Interpretation of the adjusted and unadjusted cross-country average correlations 
 
Analytically, unadjusted correlation higher than the adjusted one6 implies that the two country returns are 
correlated in the same way (that is both positively or negatively correlated) with the common external 
factor.  
Conversely, rolling adjusted correlation coefficients higher than the unadjusted ones indicate that a part of 
the “true” comovement of emerging markets was overshadowed by general trends taking place in mature 
markets. In the case in which emerging markets are oppositely linked to the common external factors, 
removing the impact of these common external factors will actually strenghten the linkages between 
emerging countries bond returns. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the evolution of aggregate correlations, adjusted and unadjusted for the presence 
of common external factors. Aggregate correlations were computed as the average of all 157 pairwise 
canonical correlations of the 18 countries within the sample over a 60-day rolling window. 
As a general feature, we notice that the adjusted and unadjusted rolling average cross correlations have 
always been positive suggesting a tendency of individual country returns to move together. The large 
spikes in global average correlations were usually associated with the major episodes of market turmoil 
suggesting less investor discrimination during sell offs compared with periods of market rallies. This 
reinforces the “crossover” nature of investors which tend to unwind their open positions in emerging 
markets during bad times.  
At the same time, we highlight a secular decline in both adjusted and unadjusted series over the whole 
period under consideration. The decline is more marked in the case of the adjusted correlations which are 
proxies for the comovement specific to emerging markets. Thus, emerging bond returns comovement 
appears to be less and less specific to emerging markets and mainly driven by events taking place in 
mature markets, as showed by the widening gap between adjusted and unadjusted average correlations 
over the last years. 
We briefly analyze the evolution of adjusted and unadjusted aggregate correlations in connection with 
the key episodes taking place during the sample period.  
The Thai devaluation in July 1997 seems to have little impact on investors’ attitude towards emerging 
markets bonds. Both unadjusted and adjusted average correlations decreased in the run-up to the crisis 
reaching 0.5 and respectively 0.2 at the time of the crisis.This downward movement lasts till the Hong 
Kong market crash of October 1997 which marks a reversal in correlations trend. Both the adjusted and 
unadjusted correlations rise and reach a peak of 0.8 and respectively 0.53 at the end of October. The 
Hong-Kong crisis could thus be viewed as a clear example of significant increased market comovement 
after controlling for the common external factors. The residual comovement doubled in the aftermath of 
the stock market crash and this is due to investors’ behavior with regard to the emerging debt instruments 
indicating a generalized sell-off.  
Unlike the previous episodes, in the case of the Russian crisis of August 1998, correlations increased prior 
to the crisis and continued during the crisis. A possible interpretation would be insufficient investor 
discrimination in the run-up to the crisis and then “herd behavior” during or after the crisis. In the 
aftermath of the Russian crisis we notice an important gap between the two average correlations indicating 
that external factors (in particular the LTCM crisis of September 1998) had a role to play in explaining 
market comovement.  
                                                 
6 i.e. the correlation of regression residuals 
  
Most of the time, adjusted returns are below the unadjusted ones, which indicates that market comovement 
was partly due to events taking place in mature markets. The most notable exception concerns the period 
leading to the Brazilian devaluation of January 1999 characterized by adjusted returns higher than the 
unadjusted ones. Moreover, adjusted returns reach during this period the highest level of the sample period 
indicating investors concerns about emerging countries specific risk.  
In the case of the Argentinean sell off of March 2000, adjusted correlations maintain at a very low level 
(around 0.3) before and after the crisis. At the same time, unadjusted correlations are particularly high 
(around 0.6) indicating that the market comovement was due to external factors (e.g. the revision of 
expectations of the US monetary policy) rather to contagion from Argentina. Similar trends are noticed in 
the case of the US-HY crisis of October 2000.  
The Turkey devaluation of February 2001 seems to have little impact on other emerging markets returns. 
The last episode of increased market comovement is the Argentinean crisis of July 2001 during which the 
investors’ fears regarding Argentina specific risks spread across emerging markets.  
Events taking place after this date (e.g. the Enron scandal in December 2001, Argentinean default at the 
end of 2002 or US interest rate rise in June 2004) did not trigger generalized disruptive effects on 
emerging markets. Adjusted correlations display a mean value around zero over the last three years 
indicating a lack of generalized emerging market comovement. This could be due, on one hand, to the 
upgrade of some emerging countries of the EMBI global to investment grade (e.g. Mexico, Bulgaria, 
Croatia) and overall good country fundamentals and, on the other hand, to low interest rates in mature 
markets which increased the attractiveness of emerging markets bonds. 
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Figure 1: Adjusted and unadjusted rolling average correlations  
 
Although the linkages of emerging market returns with the external factors are particularly strong during 
periods of market turmoil, the emerging markets “excess” comovement is decreasing over time in such a way 
that in 2005 it reaches the low levels existing before the Asian crisis. 
 
 
  
II) ARE AVERAGE CORRELATIONS A GOOD SUMMARY INDICATOR? 
 
Average correlations may not be useful in summarizing market results if the underlying distribution of 
bond returns is not unimodal (i.e. if there are underlying groups that exhibit high within-group 
comovement but not between-group comovement). Therefore there is a need to look for some evidence of 
market tiering in order to better assess the excess comovement of emerging bond returns. 
 
3. LOOKING FOR GROUPS : METHODOLOGY 
The choice of the calendar year as a time unit for performing Principal Component and Cluster Analysis 
was motivated by the fact that any transitory movement in correlation coefficients or in the underlying 
groups tends to disappear with the increase in time period.  
The simple observation of pairwise correlation coefficientsvi allowed us to distinguish the presence of 
groups of countries in our sample but the clusters composition needs further refinement in order to reflect 
the complexity of the simultaneous movements within each group. Therefore we use different types of 
Factor Analysis methods (Principal Components and Cluster Analysis) in order to identify homogenous 
groups in our sample.  
 
3.1. Principal components analysis 
 
In order to assess the global comovement of bond market returns we perform principal component 
analysisvii on adjusted bond returns of the sample countries for each calendar year of the period 1997-
2005.  
Tables 1 and 2 below report the eigenvalues for the first two principal components (i.e. its variance in 
absolute value and as a percentage of the overall variance of initial series) for both adjusted and 
unadjusted returns.  
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
PC(1) 13,18 
73,20% 
11,99 
66,59% 
8,58 
47,68% 
8,97 
49,81% 
7,88 
43,80% 
6,22 
34,56% 
7,01 
38,95% 
9,92 
62,02% 
8,65 
54,06%
PC(2) 1,31     
7,30% 
1,52 
8,46% 
1,54 
8,55% 
1,42 
7,89% 
2,28 
12,64% 
2,77 
15,36% 
2,38 
13,22% 
1,4 
8,8% 
3,38 
21,11%
cumulative 80,50% 75,05% 56,23% 57,70% 56,44% 49,92% 52,17% 70,82 % 75,17%
Table 1: Factor eigenvalue and percentage part of the variance explained by the first two 
 principal components (5-day unadjusted returns) 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
PC(1) 10,05 
55,84% 
10,70 
59,43% 
6,73 
37,38% 
7,35 
40,82% 
7,33 
40,74% 
5,82 
32,35% 
4,89 
27,21% 
6,81 
42,56% 
5,99 
37,43%
PC(2) 1,46 
8,11% 
1,98 
10,55% 
1,98 
10,99% 
1,53 
8,50% 
1,55 
8,60% 
2,07 
11,51% 
2,14 
11,91% 
1,88 
11,75% 
3,43 
21,41%
cumulative 63,95% 69,98% 48,37% 49,32% 49,35% 43,85% 39,11% 54,31% 58,84%
Table 2: Factor eigenvalue and percentage part of the variance explained by the first two  
principal components (5-day adjusted returns) 
 
By convention, the principal components are ordered by their explanatory power. The first one explains 
the most important part of initial series comovement while the second one explains a smaller percentage of 
the total variance than the first one and so on. The evolution of the part of overall variance explained, each 
year, by the first two principal components is illustrated in Annex 4. 
In the case of emerging markets adjusted returns all countries display positive correlations with the first 
principal component. The first factor can therefore be interpreted as a general factor, common to all 
emerging markets.  
The explanatory power of the first principal component increases in 1998 (during the Asian and Russian 
crises) to almost 60 percent. In the following years, the first principal component of the adjusted returns 
  
explains less and less of the emerging countries comovement: 37 percent in 1999, 41 percent in 2000 and 
2001, 32 percent in 2002 and only 27 percent in 2003 which suggests that emerging markets are more and 
more segmented. In 2004 there is a surge in emerging country links with the first component, for both 
adjusted and unadjusted returns, which means that an external event (e.g. the anticipated rise in US 
interest rates) triggered a change in market attitude towards emerging market bonds. This trend tends to 
attenuate at the beginning of 2005.  
As far as the second factor is concerned, it could be viewed as a differentiating factor among the emerging 
countries in our sample. Its contribution in explaining the overall variance in the sample varies slightly 
over the period 1997-2001 (between 8 and 10 percent) and starts to rise from 2002 onwards. The 
beginning of 2005 sees a surge in the variance explained by the second factor which may indicate 
increased regional tiering among emerging market bonds. 
Overall, the two first common factors account for 64 percent of the variance of adjusted returns in 1997, 
70 percent in 1998, only 50 percent in 1999-2000, and less than 40 percent over the last two years of the 
sample period. Their cumulative contribution increases in 2004 to 54 percent and to 58 percent in 2005. 
However, towards the end of the period, the composition of the excess comovement changed, with the 
second component (as a differentiating factor) gaining in importance compared with the beginning of the 
sample period.  
As there are eighteen normalized variables, there will be eighteen orthogonal vectors explaining the 
overall variance in the sample7. For each year we retained the number of principal components necessary 
to describe at least 80 percent of the overall variance. As indicated in the Annex 4, we need more and 
more orthogonal factors to account for the variation of countries adjusted returns or in other terms, 
individual returns seem to be less and less correlated with one major factor and thus less and less 
dependent on one another. In 1997 and 1998, the first five principal components accounted for 80 percent 
of the overall variation whereas during more recent years, eight or even nine principal components are 
needed to explain the same portion of the variation in the series of adjusted returns.  
The previous analysis put into light that emerging markets seem to be less and less integrated. The drop in 
the explanatory power suggests the absence of a general common factor driving the comovement across 
emerging countries. At the same time, it highlights the ineffectiveness of the overall average as measure of 
a global measure of market linkages.           
    
Use of Principal Component Analysis to identify clusters 
 
If there are only two or at most three principal components which explain most of the total variation in the 
original variables, the factor scores of all cases (i.e. all countries) on these factors may reveal the presence 
of clusters. The factor loadings for each country in the sample could be viewed as a measure of association 
between individual countries adjusted returns and the principal components which account for the major 
part of the total variance. In fact, they represent the correlations of the variables (countries) with the 
factors. Therefore countries displaying factor loadings of opposite signs for the first or the second 
principal components can be assigned to different clusters. The sample fragmentation becomes more 
difficult whenever factors exhibit only positive or negative weights-indicating that the factor corresponds 
to a similar (upward or downward) movement in individual country returns.  
We notice that some countries are highly correlated with this first factor (see Annex 6 for PCA country 
loadings) indicating the presence of a set of “core” countries moving together whereas the other countries 
are less sensitive to general trends. Positive and negative (and significant in many cases) correlations with 
the second factor reinforces the idea of a two-tier system in emerging markets.  
As the two principal components are orthogonal, countries highly correlated with the first factor tend to 
exhibit negative correlations with the second factor. Therefore, one intuitive criterion for identify the 
eventual presence of two clusters of countries is to group together countries highly correlated with the first 
factor (e.g. PC (1) ≥ 0,7) and negatively correlated with the second (e.g. PC (2) ≤ -0,15) in one cluster, and 
                                                 
7 The eigenvalues for a given factor measure the variance in all the sample variables which is accounted for by that 
factor. If a factor has a low eigenvalue then it contributed little to the explanation of variances in the series of 
adjusted returns and might be ignored as redundant. In order to establish the number of factors driving the 
comovement in emerging bond markets we can apply the Kaiser criterion according to which all components with 
eigenvalues less than unity should not be taken into account. However, we chose a widely used variance explained 
criteria which consist in keeping enough factors to account for 90 or sometimes 80 percent of the overall variance. 
  
countries less correlated on the first factor (and therefore less correlated with all other emerging countries) 
and positively correlated with the second factor, in another cluster. This strategy ensures that although 
countries in the second cluster are not always significantly correlated with all countries in their cluster, the 
within cluster correlations are higher than the correlations between clusters. 
 
3.2. Cluster analysis 
 
We furthermore refine our analysis by performing cluster analysisviii on the series of adjusted returns of 
emerging countries with the aim of identifying a set of country groups (in particular two subgroups to 
keep the analysis coherent with the previous two methods) which both minimizes the within group 
variation and maximizes the between group variation.  
Figures 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 19 in Annex 5 illustrate the clusters composition computed by the K-
means procedure imposing the presence of two clusters. It is worth noticing that we performed clustering 
taking into account different numbers of groups but the two-tier system seems to best separate (if there is 
any discrimination on the part of investors) the EMBI countries.  
 Within each cluster, countries are ordered according to their distance to the cluster center that is the 
average distance within-group. From the scatter plots of cluster membership by their distance to the cluster 
center we can notice that the majority of countries in each cluster are situated to a distance inferior to 16. 
Farther than this limit, countries are regarded as outliers which alter the final classification (as it is 
strongly the case from 1998 through 2001).  
 
 
4. AGGREGATE  RESULTS  
 
The evolutions of the average correlation coefficients within and between groups, using the whole sample, 
according to the PCA taxonomy are illustrated in Annex 5. We took into account in the group 
composition, the country loadings displayed by the unrotated PCA procedure as well as the maximum and 
minimum annual average correlations of each country with the other emerging countries in the sample 
(from the annual correlation matrixes previously computed). As several countries may have changed 
group over the calendar year, we check whether clustering analysis provides a better separation of the two 
groups. We tried to improve our findings by removing outliers (see the results of clustering analysis in the 
Annex 5) and countries ambiguously high correlated with the two principal components. The charts 
presented in the Annex 5 (figures 2, 4, 6,8,10,12,14,16 and 18) enable us to detect periods where the “two-
tier paradigm” prevails in emerging markets.  
We then inquire on the underlying factors driving the market segmentation and we check the pertinence of 
investors’ discrimination according to the credit rating, regional aspects or crises occurrence in the near 
past.   
The idea consists in identifying two distinct clusters in the sample which simultaneously exhibit higher 
within group variance or comovement and lower (minimum) between group variance. Average 
correlations of the two clusters move in opposite directions, the first one being characterized by a higher 
variance (as it is highly correlated with the first principal component, as described in the previous section). 
By clusters construction, countries uncorrelated or very low correlated with the other emerging countries 
fall in the second group characterized by a lower variance.  
Let us briefly analyze the emerging market comovement year by year.  
In 1997, we notice a clear discriminating behavior of global investors roughly to the Hong Kong stock 
market collapse in October when correlations within both groups rise abruptly. However there is still 
evidence of investors’ differentiation as regard to risk of securities in the two categories after that date. 
Over the last quarter of the year it becomes clear that the shocks from Asia affected mainly the most 
vulnerable emerging countries. As the average between clusters rose sharply at the time of the Hong –
Kong collapse, we performed rotated PCA in order to better separate the two groups of countries. The 
results are summarized in the table below.  
  
Group 1 Rating Region 1997 Group 2 Rating Region
ARG BB-/BB L.A. COL BBB- L.A.
BRA B+/BB- L.A. CRO BBB- Eu&ME&Afr
BUL n.r. Eu&ME&Afr KOR AA-/A-/BB- Asia
ECU n.r. L.A. MAL A+ Asia
MEX BB L.A. PHI BB+ Asia
MOR n.r. Eu&ME&Afr POL BBB- Eu&ME&Afr
PAN BB+ L.A. RUS BB- Eu&ME&Afr
PER n.r. L.A. SAF BB+ Eu&ME&Afr
VEN B/B+ L.A. TUR B Eu&ME&Afr
ROTATED PCA  
The first group is composed of countries rated as underinvestment grade and mainly from Latin America. 
The second group of countries, mainly from Europe, South Africa and Asia, displays lower comovement 
than the first one over the whole period which could indicate that these emerging debt instruments are 
perceived as less risky than those in the first cluster. Indeed, all countries in this category, excepted for 
Turkey are rated as investment grade. 
In 1998, correlation matrixes, PCA and clustering show that the major part of the emerging markets 
comovement is driven by events in Russia. The countries loadings for the first component are extremely 
high which is consistent with the crossover nature of the investor base.  
The first principal component is a factor which makes the emerging markets move together, especially 
during periods of market turmoil. If there is evidence of indiscriminate behavior of global investors and 
broad-based sell-off across emerging markets (whenever a negative event occurs in one connected market) 
this is captured by the first principal component. All emerging markets are affected by the events in Russia 
even if Colombia, Malaysia and Korea show lower comovement with the rest of the sample. Figure 4 in 
Annex 5 shows that the distinction based on PCA prevailed roughly during the first half of the year but 
cannot be explained either by regional aspect or credit rating.  
In 1999 there is evidence of market tiering (see figure 6 in Annex 5) although the composition of groups 
changes during the year. In particular, Bulgaria and Poland are perceived as risky at the beginning of the 
period, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. Investors’ attitude changes over time in such a way that at 
the end of the year these countries fall into the second cluster, characterized by lower volatility. The 
rotated PCA (see table below) highlight the presence of two groups of countries along 1999. The first 
cluster regroups Latin American countries rated underinvestment grade (thus viewed as riskier by global 
investors) whereas the second is composed of Asian and European&Middle Eastern countries rated 
investment grade by S&P (with the exception of Bulgaria, Morocco and the Philippines). 
Group 1 Rating Region 1999 Group 2 Rating Region
ARG BB L.A. BUL B+ Eu&ME&Afr
BRA B+ L.A. CRO BBB- Eu&ME&Afr
COL BBB-/BB+ L.A. KOR BB+/BBB-/BB Asia
ECU n.r. L.A. MAL BBB-/BBB Asia
MEX BB L.A. MOR BB Eu&ME&Afr
PAN BB+ L.A. PHI BB+ Asia
PER BB L.A. POL BBB-/BBB Eu&ME&Afr
TUR B Eu&ME&Afr RUS CCC-/SD Eu&ME&Afr
VEN B+/B L.A. SAF BB+ Eu&ME&Afr
ROTATED PCA  
In 2000, investors’ discriminating attitude prevailed roughly until the Argentinean sell-off (see Figure 8 in 
Annex 5). In the wake of the Argentinean sell off. the debt issued by countries like Brazil,  Mexico, 
Venezuela, Russia or the Asian countries was (temporary) perceived as riskier, Irrespective of their credit 
rating whereas issuers from Europe were not affected by this increase in the risk aversion of global 
investors.  
The following year proves to be a period of indiscriminate behavior of global investors and high overall 
comovement. Events in Turkey and Argentina negatively affected the risk perception of emerging 
countries by global investors. 
However, in 2003 average correlations within clusters start to decline8 indicating less market comovement 
triggered by emerging markets specific factors. 
Over the period 2003 to present, one can notice that markets are less and less intertwined as the 
explanatory power of underlying factor decline. However, every year, there is still a bunch of countries 
                                                 
8 Which is in line with the correlation analysis (based on adjusted and unadjusted returns, see section 3). 
  
highly linked to this common factor which indicates that these emerging countries are more vulnerable to 
negative events taking place in another emerging market.  
In 2003, the high variance cluster is composed mainly of Latin American issuers rated below investment grade 
by S&P (see table below). 
 
The presence of Mexico, upgraded the previous year, is due to regional aspects. It is worth noticing that 
Argentina appears in the second cluster because it is negatively correlated or almost uncorrelated with all the 
countries in the sample but cluster analysis (see figures 13,15 and 17 in Annex 5) suggests that Argentina is an 
outlier, especially after its government default in 2002.  
In 2004, the first group of countries was more affected by the change in investors’ behavior regarding the 
emerging markets (see figure 17 in Annex 5). As illustrated by the table below, the most vulnerable are the 
subinvestment grade credits, mainly from Latin America and this situation lasts at beginning of 2005.   
 
 
  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
The objective of the present paper was to assess the respective part of common external factors and market 
behavior in explaining comovements in emerging bond returns. We tried to address the following 
questions regarding the linkages among emerging debt markets: Are markets integrated or segmented? 
Are global investors treating them indiscriminately or there is evidence of market tiering? What are the 
underlying factors driving the market segmentation? Are returns in each emerging country driven by 
common external factors or an idiosyncratic shock occurring on one emerging market is likely to 
propagate across the other emerging markets?  
Our analysis covered 18 out of 33 emerging countries initially included in the EMBI global over the 
period 1997 to present. In order to distinguish between common external and idiosyncratic factors in 
explaining bond markets comovement, we performed 60-day rolling regressions of initial emerging bond 
returns against three external factors (US_TB, SPX_Index and US_HY). The correlation coefficients of 
residuals thus became a measure of the excess-comovement of emerging bond markets - the comovement 
unexplained by common external factors- generally attributed to market behavior. 
As far as the links of emerging market returns with the three external factors are concerned, we noticed 
that the links with the US_TB decrease over time (as reflected by sensitivities and correlation coefficients 
close to zero from the end of 1999 onwards). However, links with HY and SPX Indexes are high and 
extremely volatile over the sample period indicating that these two external factors had a role to play in 
Group 1 Rating Region 2003 Group 2 Rating Region
BRA B+ L.A. ARG SD L.A.
COL BB L.A. BUL BB/BB+ Eu&ME&Afr
ECU CCC+ L.A. CRO BBB- Eu&ME&Afr
MEX BBB- L.A. KOR A- Asia
MOR BB Eu&ME&Afr MAL BBB+/A- Asia
PAN BB L.A. PHI BB+/BB Asia
PER BB- L.A. POL BBB+ Eu&ME&Afr
RUS BB Eu&ME&Afr SAF BBB-/BBB Eu&ME&Afr
TUR B-/B/B+ Eu&ME&Afr
VEN CCC+/B- L.A. UNROTATED PCA 
Group 1 Rating Region 2004 Group 2 Rating Region
ARG SD L.A. BUL BB+/BBB- Eu&ME&Afr
BRA B+/BB- L.A. MAL A- Asia
COL BB L.A. POL BBB+ Eu&ME&Afr
ECU CCC+ L.A. RUS BB/BB+ Eu&ME&Afr
MEX BBB- L.A. SAF BBB Eu&ME&Afr
MOR BB Eu&ME&Afr TUR B+/BB- Eu&ME&Afr
PAN BB L.A.
PER BB-/BB L.A.
PHI BB/BB- Asia
VEN B-/B L.A. ROTATED PCA 
  
explaining emerging market comovements. Still, during the first half of the sample period, these two 
external factors had a more homogenous impact on emerging bond returns compared with the latter part of 
the period. In the latter part one can notice that emerging markets behave differently as regards to the 
external factors. More precisely, there is a group of countries characterized by regression and correlation 
coefficients extremely volatile whereas in the second group the impact of external factors seems to be 
almost inexistent.   
Although the linkages of emerging market returns with the external factors are particularly strong 
during periods of market turmoil, global comovement, as measured by adjusted and unadjusted correlation 
coefficients, is decreasing over the period under consideration.  
 Furthermore we put into question the average correlations method which may not be useful in 
summarizing market results if the underlying distribution of bond returns is not unimodal. To this effect, 
we used several methods on a year-to-year basis in order to identify periods where the “two-tier paradigm” 
of emerging markets prevails. 
The analysis of correlation matrixes enabled us to identify groups of countries moving together during the 
recent events in emerging markets. These findings were further refined by performing Principal 
Component and Cluster Analysis. In order to separate the two groups of countries we provided an 
intuitively method of cluster construction based on the correlations with the first two principal 
components.  
The results of the Factor analysis methods were convergent and indicate the presence of two 
groups of countries within the EMBI global sample during tranquil times: the first three quarters of 1997, 
from the third quarter of 1999 to the end of 2000 and from  2003 onwards. One of them, which we labeled 
the “core group” driving the major part of the markets comovement, is characterized by high within 
average correlations whereas the other is characterized by a relatively low within average. By construction 
of the two clusters, countries in each group are more correlated with countries within the same group than 
with countries outside their group. We finally put into light that regional patterns and credit quality 
differentiation have an important role to play in investor discriminating behavior regarding the emerging 
bond markets. 
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Notes :  
 
i) 
 
March 1997 February 2005
Index Weight Index Weight
Argentina 20,00% 1,85%
Brazil 19,20% 19,20%
Bulgaria 1,80% 0,81%
Colombia 1,10% 3,37%
Croatia 0,60% *
Ecuador 1,30% 1,33%
Malaysia 2,50% 3,48%
Mexico 15,20% 18,30%
Morocco 1,10% 0,33%
Panama 1,90% 2,01%
Peru 1,30% 2,45%
Philippines 2,90% 5,32%
Poland 2,70% 1,19%
Russia 6,30% 13,04%
South Africa 0,50% 1,71%
South Korea 7,50% *
Turkey 0,90% 7,48%
Venezuela 5,60% 5,64%
Latin America 65,60% 54,15%
Asia 12,90% 8,80%
Eur&MidEast&Africa 13,90% 24,56%
Total 92,40% 87,51%
Korea were dropped out from the index
during 2004
The EMBI global is a traditional, market
capitalization-weighted index which currently
covers 31 emerging market countries. Included in
the EMBI global are US-dollar denominated Brady
Bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local market
debt instruments issued by sovereign and quasi
sovereign entities.  
It differs from its predecessor – the Emerging
Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) - by the country
selection criteria (the per capita income level as
defined by the World Bank and the country debt
restructuring history instead of selecting country
solely on a sovereign credit rating basis). Precisely,
EMBI Global includes countries classified as having
low or middle per capita income by the World Bank
or having restructured their external or local debt in
the last 10 years or currently being in process of
restructuring its external or local debt. By contrast,
countries included in the EMBI+ must only be rated
(BBB-)/(Baa3) or lower by S&P and Moody`s.  
These two selection criteria allow the EMBI global 
to include a number of higher rated countries that 
international investors have nevertheless considered 
part of the emerging market universe. The index 
considers for inclusion emerging markets issues 
denominated in US dollars with a minimum current 
face outstanding of US$500 million and at least 2 
1/2 years to maturity at the time of the inclusion in 
the index. No additional liquidity tests are required 
as it is the case with the EMBI+. 
  
   
 
                                                 
 
ii  The total return from one trading day to the next, on a single instrument included in the EMBI global takes into 
account the bond price and the coupon payment (or/and amortization if applicable) according to the following 
relation: 
1
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where  
)t(sESV  is the effective settlement value that is principally the bond price.  
)(tvC  is the coupon payment to which a holder on trade date t is entitled on value date v(t); (that is the date used to 
compute the accrued interests and generally coincides, but not always, with the settlement date) The coupon payment 
is determined by the instrument structure, ex-coupon conventions and holiday calendar 
tAM  is the bond amortization (if applicable), also determined by the instrument structure, ex-coupon conventions 
and holiday calendar; 
 
iii The price of day i between the first day of market closure (denoted by k) and the first day of market opening 
(denoted by n  , with n>k) is computed according to the relation: )ki(
kn
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RR knki 11
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iv SPX Index stands for Standard & Poor`s 500 (S&P500) Composite Stock Price Index which serves as a common 
yardstick against which all US stock performance is measured. It is especially used to compare and evaluate the 
performance of institutional portfolios and has become one of the US Department of Commerce’s 12 economic 
indicators. 
S&P500 is a market capitalization-weighted index that tracks the continuous price only and daily total return 
performance of 500 common stocks of leading domestic and foreign companies in leading industries within the US 
that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the Nasdaq 
National Market System. The S&P500, a measure of large capitalization stocks, accounts for about 64% of the 
market value of shares listed on the three exchanges.  
 
v In this case, the estimated model would be the following: 
`R`R`R`R``R tt,HY_USt,Index_SPXt,TB_USt,jt,i εβββββ +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= 43210                (23) 
That could be explained by the fact that, in the bivariate case, the partial correlation of unadjusted returns is no more 
than the canonical correlation between the residuals of the partial regressions of these returns on a constant and the 
common external factors.  
Therefore the partial correlation coefficient between the two countries returns, while the other dependent variables 
are constant, becomes:  
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where *,tiR , *,tjR  are respectively the residuals of a regression of initial returns on the three external factors and a 
constant. These terms are actually equal to iε and respectively jε  in relation (22).  
The two pair wise correlation coefficients are therefore equivalent, that is  
),( ji εερ = )R,R,R/R,R( t,HY_USt,Index_SPXt,TB_USt,jt,iρ                            (25) 
However, in spite of the fact that the output is the same in terms of linear association between returns, the first 
method enables us to have also a measure of bond returns sensitivity to variations of the external factors previously 
mentioned. 
 
vi A first approach for identifying groups of countries moving together was based on the matrixes of adjusted 
correlations of five-day returns captured on nine successive years from 1997 to 2005. Emerging countries were 
divided into several groups based on the maximum coefficient in the matrixes of adjusted correlations in such a way 
that each country in a given group exhibited the strongest correlation with another country of the same group. 
According to this criterion, we noticed that the comovement of emerging bond returns presented marked regional 
features in the first year of the sample period. More precisely, in 1997 there was evidence of market segmentation, 
with a Latin American group, an Asian group and two European & Middle Eastern groups. The only exceptions to 
the regional segmentation were Russia which was viewed as “Latin” by global investors (maybe because its 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
sovereign debt was mainly composed of Brady Bonds) and Colombia which had strong linkages with European 
bonds (that could be due to the fact that Colombian bonds were the only rated investment grade from Latin America 
and thus seen as less risky by global investors). With the exception of 1998, when correlation analysis proved to be 
ineffective in detecting groups of countries, markets in Asia (Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines) showed higher 
comovement within the group than with other emerging markets until 2001. At the same time there was higher 
comovement within the Latin American group than cross regional comovement-except for Poland (highest correlated 
with Mexico) and Bulgaria (highest correlated with Brazil) falling in the Latin group in 1999 and respectively in 
2000.  
Starting with 2001, factors behind market tiering became less obvious. For instance, the Philippines appeared to be 
more correlated with Latin American countries than with Malaysia and Korea. The fact that the Philippines was the 
only under investment grade of the three Asian countries in our sample, could explain its risk perception by global 
investors. But, at the same time, Mexico, upgraded in 2002 to investment grade, remained highest correlated during 
2002 and 2003 with Brazil (underinvestment grade and even downgraded in mid 2002 from (BB-) to (B+)).  
In 2004 we identify a Latin American group underinvestment grade (Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Panama and Ecuador) 
characterized by high correlations. Inspite the upgrading in 2002 and improved economic policy, Mexico remains 
associated with the other low grade bonds of countries in the region. We also notice strong correlations between 
Russia and Turkey which indicates investors’ cautiousness towards underinvestment bonds. In 2005, following the 
upgrade of Russia, this country shows high correlations with Mexico and seems to be uncorrelated with the other 
emerging market bonds. The Latin American group is still highly correlated in 2005. Still investors discrimination 
according to the credit quality become apparent as Mexico become uncorrelated with the other low grade bonds of 
Latin American countries.  
 
vii This multivariate procedure capture the simultaneous movement of bond returns using a small set of factors called 
principal components. It condenses the complexity of the simultaneous movements of emerging markets bond 
returns, capturing these movements using just a few vectors. 
The choice of this method was also motivated by the fact that normality is not a necessary assumption for PCA as it 
is for OLS regressions. 
Precisely, the method provides a first linear combination of initial variables such as the maximum variance is 
extracted from the variables. It then removes this variance and seeks a second linear combination which explains the 
maximum proportion of the remaining variance and so on. The results are orthogonal (uncorrelated) factors and the 
higher the degree of comovement among country series, the smaller the number of factors explaining a given portion 
of the overall variance.  
For each year, the cases (rows) are represented by the cross-sectional returns whereas the variables (columns) are the 
eighteen emerging countries in the sample. 
The procedure starts by standardizing the initial data so that each variable have a zero mean and a unit standard 
deviation. In this way all series will be uniformly treated and the construction of the principal components will not be 
influenced disproportionately by the series of adjusted returns exhibiting the largest variance in our sample. 
 
viii As it is usually recommended in the case of large samples, we performed K-means clustering on the transposed 
and standardized observations in order to ensure that variables receive equal treatment (as variables with large values 
would contribute more to the calculations of distance measures than those with small values). In our case, the rows or 
the cases are represented by the eighteen countries and the variables are the adjusted returns on each trading day for 
all the countries in the sample. The K-means cluster analysis begins by the use of the first K cases (k=2) in the data 
file as temporary estimates of the K cluster centers. Initial cluster centers are selected by assigning each case in turn 
to the cluster with the closest center and then the clusters are recomputed again. This process continues until no 
further changes occur in cluster centers and the maximum number of iterations (10 by default) is reached. The 
procedure is based on the Euclidian distance as a measure of similarity (or distance) for different pair of observations 
(cases represented by the eighteen countries in our case). If we think of each case as plotted in a two-dimension 
system, then the Euclidian distance is the square root of the sum of the square of the X - distance and the square of 
the Y-distance. As the cluster analysis is not based on the correlation matrix (this option can only be chosen with the 
hierarchical clustering-inadequate for large number of cases), the results of this method will be slightly different 
from the PCA and other correlation –based methods. Clustering resembles Principal Component analysis as both aim 
at identifying related groups of variables. However, cluster analysis is more ad-hoc, the number of clusters is 
intuitive and the presence of outliers strongly affects the final output. Therefore we use clustering in order to support 
the findings of PCA especially in the case of the countries very closed to one another and to the cluster center. 
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Figure 2 : 1997 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
Cluster analysis - 1997 
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Figure 3: 1997 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign rating over the period (3/10/97-end 97) 
Argentina:  2/4/1997—upgraded from (BB-) to (BB) 
Brazil: 2/4/1997—upgraded from (B+) to (BB-) 
Venezuela: 5/6/1997: upgraded from (B) to (B+) 
South Korea: 24/10/1997—downgraded from (AA-) to (A+);  
                   25/11/1997 downgraded from (A+) to (A-);      
                   11/12/1997—downgraded from (A-) to (BBB-);   
                  22/12/1997—downgraded from (BBB-) to (B+).
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Figure 4 : 1998 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
Cluster analysis 1998 (RUS excluded) 
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Figure 5 : 1998 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign ratings over the period 
Bulgaria: rated starting with 17/04/98 : (B+) 
Korea: 18/02/1998: upgraded from (B+) to (BB+) 
Malaysia: 17/04/1998: downgraded from A to (A-);  
               24/07/1998: downgraded from (A-) to (BBB+);      
               15/09/1998: downgraded from (BBB+) to (BBB-). 
Morroco: rated starting with 2/03/1998 : (BB) 
Russia: 9/06/1998: downgraded from (BB-) to (B+) 
            13/08/1998: downgraded from (B+) to (B-) 
            17/08/1998: downgraded from (B-) to (CCC) 
            16/09/1998: downgraded from (CCC) to (CCC-) 
  
14
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
04
/01
/99
18
/01
/99
01
/02
/99
15
/02
/99
01
/03
/99
15
/03
/99
29
/03
/99
12
/04
/99
26
/04
/99
10
/05
/99
24
/05
/99
07
/06
/99
21
/06
/99
05
/07
/99
19
/07
/99
02
/08
/99
16
/08
/99
30
/08
/99
13
/09
/99
27
/09
/99
11
/10
/99
25
/10
/99
08
/11
/99
22
/11
/99
06
/12
/99
20
/12
/99
AVG CLUSTER 1 AVG CLUSTER 2 AVG BETWEEN
ARG, BRA, BUL, COL, 
ECU, MEX, MOR, PAN, 
PER, POL, TUR, VEN
CRO, KOR, MAL, 
PHI, RUS, SAF
Brazilian 
devaluation
13/01/1999
Average between 
clusters
1999
 
Figure 6 : 1999 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
 
Cluster analysis 1999 (RUS, ECU excepted)
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Figure 7 : 1999 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign rating over the period 
Colombia: 21/09/1999: downgraded from (BBB-) to (BB+) 
Korea: 25/01/1999: upgraded from (BB+) to (BBB-);       
            11/11/1999: upgraded from (BBB-) to (BBB) 
Malaysia: 10/11/1999: upgraded from (BBB-) to (BBB) 
Poland: 10/06/1999: upgraded from (BBB-) to (BBB)  
Russia: 27/01/1999: downgraded from (CCC-) to SD 
Ecuador: n.r. 
Venezuela: 21/12/1999: downgraded from (B+) to (B) 
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Figure 8 : 2000 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
 
Cluster Analysis 2000 ( ECU, RUS, PER, PHI, COL, VEN excluded)
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Figure 9 : 2000 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign rating over the period 
Argentina: 14/11/2000: downgraded from (BB) to (BB-) 
Colombia: 5/24/2000: downgraded from (BB+) to (BB) 
Ecuador: rated starting with 31/07/2000: (B-) 
Mexico: 13/03/2000 upgraded from (BB) to (BB+) 
Poland: 10/05/2000: upgraded from (BBB) to (BBB+) 
Russia: 12/8/2000: upgraded from SD to (B-) 
Peru: 11/1/2000: downgraded from (BB) to (BB-) 
Philippines: (BB+) 
South Africa: 2/25/2000: upgraded from (BB+) to (BBB-) 
Turkey: 4/25/2000 upgraded from (B) to (B+) 
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Figure 10 : 2001 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
Cluster analysis 2001 (ARG, TUR, PER, ECU excluded)
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Figure 11 : 2001 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign Rating over the period 
 
Ecuador: 2/04/2001: downgraded from (B-) to (CCC+) 
Russia: 28/06/01:upgraded from (B-) to (B) ;  
             19/12/01: upgraded from (B) to (B+) 
Korea: 13/11/01: upgraded from (BBB) to (BBB+) 
Turkey: 23/02/2001:downgraded from (B+) to (B) 
             16/04/2001: downgraded from (B) to (B-) 
Argentina: 26/03/2001: downgraded from (BB-) to (B+) 
                8/05/2001: downgraded from (B+) to (B) 
                12/07/2001: downgraded from (B) to (B-) 
                9/10/2001: downgraded from (B-) to (CCC+) 
                30/10/2001: downgraded from (CCC+) to (CC) 
                6/11/2001: downgraded from (CC) to SD 
Panama: 20/11/01: downgraded from (BB+) to (BB)
  
17
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
02
/01
/02
16
/01
/02
30
/01
/02
13
/02
/02
27
/02
/02
13
/03
/02
27
/03
/02
10
/04
/02
24
/04
/02
08
/05
/02
22
/05
/02
05
/06
/02
19
/06
/02
03
/07
/02
17
/07
/02
31
/07
/02
14
/08
/02
28
/08
/02
11
/09
/02
25
/09
/02
09
/10
/02
23
/10
/02
06
/11
/02
20
/11
/02
04
/12
/02
18
/12
/02
AVG CLUSTER 2 AVG CLUSTER 1 AVG BETWEEN
ARG, MAL, MOR, 
PHI, KOR, VEN
BRA, BUL, COL, 
CRO, ECU, MEX, 
PAN, PER, POL, 
RUS, SAF, TUR
2002
Average between 
clusters
Argentinean 
default
02/12/2002
Brazilian sell off
mid June 2002
Brazilian real 
depreciation
31/07/2002
 
Figure 12 : 2002 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
Cluster analysis 2002 (all countries)
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Figure 13 : 2002- Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign rating over the period 
Brazil: 2/07/02—downgraded from (BB-) to (B+) 
Bulgaria: 14/01/02 : upgraded from (B+) to (BB-) 
    29/10/02 : upgraded from (BB-) to (BB) 
Malaysia: 20/08/02 –upgraded from (BBB) to (BBB+)
Mexico: 7/02/02—upgraded from (BB+) to (BBB-) 
Russia: 26/07/02—upgraded from (B+) to (BB-);  
             5/12/02—upgraded from (BB-) to (BB) 
Korea: 24/07/02—upgraded from (BBB+) to (A-) 
Venezuela: 24/09/02—downgraded from (B) to (B-);  
                  13/12/02—downgraded from (B-) to (CCC+) 
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Figure 14: 2003 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
Cluster Analysis- 2003 
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Figure 15 : 2003 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign rating over the period 
 
Bulgaria: 24/07/03 –upgraded from (BB) to (BB+) 
Turkey : 28/07/03 : upgraded from (B-) to (B) 
 16/10/03 : upgraded from (B) to (B+) 
South Africa: 2/05/03: upgraded from (BBB-) to (BBB) 
 
Philippines: 24/04/03—downgraded from (BB+) to (BB) 
Venezuela : 30/07/03: upgraded from (CCC+) to (B-) 
Malaysia : 8/10/03 : upgraded from (BBB+) to (A-) 
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Figure 16 : 2004 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
 
Cluster Analysis 2004 (16 countries*)
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Figure 17 : 2004 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign rating over the period 
Bulgaria : 4/08/04 : upgraded from (BB+) to (BBB-) 
Brazil : 17/09/04 : upgraded from (B+) to (BB-) 
Turkey : 17/08/04 : upgraded from (B+) to (BB-)
Peru : 8/06/04 : upgraded from (BB-) to (BB) 
Venezuela : 25/08/04 : upgraded from (B-) to (B)  
Russia : 27/01/04 : upgraded from (BB) to (BB+) 
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Figure 18 : 2005 - Groups composition according to the PCA taxonomy and 
country average correlations of adjusted returns 
 
Cluster Analysis 2005 (ARG and ECU excepted*)
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Figure 19 : 2005 - Cluster analysis (k = 2) 
Changes in S&P Sovereign rating over the period 
 
 
Ecuador : 24/01/05 : upgraded from (CCC+) to (B-) 
Venezuela :18/01/05 : downgraded from (B) to (SD)
Russia : 31/01/05 : upgraded from (BB+) to (BBB-) 
Philippines : 17/01/05 : downgraded from (BB) to (BB-) 
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ANNEX 6 
 
Component matrix- first factor loadings-adjusted returns 
Z 
SCORE 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ARG 0.9309 0.9317 0.8224 0.7323 0.7417 0.2552 0,187 0,1637 0,3130
BRA 0.9154 0.9285 0.8123 0.8591 0.8416 0.8292 0,813 0,7495 0,9397
BUL 0.7845 0.9177 0.6964 0.7028 0.7574 0.6563 0,387 0,5956 0,2652
COL 0.6502 0.5880 0.5859 0.5471 0.5340 0.5275 0,685 0,8852 0,8709
CRO 0.7637 0.6741 0.3171 0.2604 0.4569 0.1698 0,312 xx xx
ECU 0.7865 0.8584 0.4571 0.4007 0.6988 0.6753 0,646 0,7273 0,7343
MAL 0.3464 0.2757 0.3243 0.6689 0.3357 0.0848 0,238 0,4436 0,1315
MEX 0.8279 0.9033 0.8930 0.7431 0.8358 0.8323 0,257 0,8236 0,5586
MOR 0.8640 0.8852 0.7491 0.6180 0.6680 0.5154 0,757 0,1554 -0,1842
PAN 0.7903 0.9012 0.7083 0.6990 0.6746 0.7334 0,229 0,8563 0,8018
PER 0.8404 0.7817 0.7432 0.6720 0.6497 0.7176 0,535 0,8242 0,7356
PHI 0.6890 0.6812 0.6345 0.6941 0.5557 0.5183 0,751 0,5897 -0,2087
POL 0.7711 0.8306 0.6624 0.5968 0.4086 0.2530 0,458 0,1425 0,1031
RUS 0.7654 0.7415 0.3203 0.7000 0.8868 0.8568 0,217 0,7400 0,7255
SAF 0.6756 0.5783 0.2190 0.5651 0.5055 0.3181 0,71 0,5522 -0,1633
KOR 0.1322 0.6397 0.5076 0.6331 0.1790 0.0821 0,566 xx xx
TUR 0.6170 0.6189 0.1089 0.3617 0.5741 0.6024 0,493 0,6908 0,8195
VEN 0.8447 0.8116 0.6894 0.7424 0.7111 0.5654 0,382 0,7372 0,9023
 
Component matrix- second factor loadings-adjusted returns 
 
Z 
SCORE 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ARG -0.1478 -0.0326 -0.1584 -0.1436 0.1296 -0.0421 0,095 -0,3874 -0,3510
BRA -0.1084 0.1160 -0.1382 0.0577 -0.0801 0.1726 -0,26 -0,3193 -0,1594
BUL -0.1658 -0.0371 0.3034 0.2517 -0.1557 -0.0952 0,294 0,5253 0,6075
COL 0.3503 0.5421 -0.3992 0.1908 -0.0077 -0.1870 -0,263 -0,0408 -0,2559
CRO -0.0336 0.1942 0.5563 0.3929 -0.0597 -0.2319 0,066 xx xx
ECU -0.2246 0.2249 -0.3230 0.3215 0.0738 -0.1164 0,022 -0,1302 0,5578
MAL 0.6422 0.8218 0.6189 -0.5331 0.7918 0.8538 0,857 0,0118 0,7410
MEX -0.0521 0.0092 -0.0992 0.1226 0.0703 0.1101 0,861 0,0254 0,6398
MOR -0.0643 -0.1181 0.1547 -0.0810 0.0345 0.1912 -0,242 -0,1597 -0,0744
PAN -0.1452 -0.1408 -0.2625 0.1522 -0.0015 -0.0009 0,019 0,0627 -0,3558
PER -0.2156 0.1958 -0.3415 0.0935 0.1000 -0.1390 -0,307 -0,0923 -0,3461
PHI 0.4075 0.2298 0.3810 -0.4643 -0.0100 0.2124 -0,157 -0,2382 0,7669
POL -0.0413 -0.4165 0.0182 0.1263 -0.2995 -0.5259 0,444 0,8469 0,6423
RUS -0.0356 -0.1094 0.3438 0.3107 -0.1569 -0.0313 0,066 0,0955 0,4251
SAF 0.2816 -0.4352 -0.1036 0.0961 -0.1644 -0.2702 0,061 0,6408 -0,0668
KOR 0.6783 0.0215 0.5550 -0.5835 0.8169 0.8490 0,058 xx xx
TUR 0.1449 -0.5696 -0.1857 0.3432 -0.1970 -0.0275 0,083 -0,0444 0,0950
VEN -0.0914 0.0227 -0.2244 -0.1215 -0.0358 0.1189 -0,191 -0,3152 -0,3549
 
Separation criteria:  
Cluster 1 : PC(1) >=0,7 or PC(2) <= -0,15 
Cluster 2 : PC(1) < 0,7 or PC(2) >  -0,15 
